Short, practical takeaways from real court cases — for busy professionals.
📅 September 2026
This month’s articles: a trust case where the High Court ordered a family bungalow sold after more than fifteen years of deadlock; a constitutional explainer on the conditional pardon granted to Najib Razak, and what the courts can still review; a criminal appeal where the Court of Appeal upheld a travel company director’s conviction for collecting RM434,250 through a company that had already been wound up; and a banking case where the High Court held that an online payment system cannot ignore the very information it requires.
When a Brother Holds a Bungalow on Trust for His Sisters
A bungalow bought in 1978 for three children was registered in the son’s name alone because his sisters were minors. The court found that he held two-thirds of it on trust for them. After more than fifteen years of litigation, and with all three siblings in their sixties and seventies, the High Court ordered the property sold and the proceeds divided equally.
Takeaway: A bare trustee has no independent power of sale — but that is the premise on which Section 59 of the Trustees Act 1949 operates, not an obstacle to it. Where co-owners are deadlocked and a trustee lacks the power the beneficiaries need, the court can supply it. For families buying property together, a declaration of trust signed at the outset would remove one source of uncertainty. The judge also warned that delay carries its own risk: as co-owners age, their shares pass to their own heirs, and a dispute among three can become a dispute among many.
The Pardon and the Process
On 18 September 2026, Najib Razak was granted a conditional pardon, allowing him to serve the remainder of his SRC International sentence under house arrest until August 2028. The 64th Pardons Board meeting had convened and advised before the King acted — the same process the High Court said was required when it dismissed his earlier bid almost nine months before.
Takeaway: The exercise of mercy is the King’s, but the framework within which it is exercised is the Constitution’s — and the courts will enforce that framework. The pardon itself is not reviewable on its merits, but the process is. A conditional pardon also depends on compliance: any breach automatically revokes it. The pardon covers the SRC sentence only, leaving the 1MDB conviction, the tax bill, and the civil judgment untouched.
Read the full article →
Read the earlier article on the December 2025 judgment →
The Umrah Packages, the Wound-Up Company, and the RM434,250 Cheating Case
A travel company director collected RM434,250 from 202 would-be pilgrims for umrah and Egypt travel packages, even though his company had been wound up more than nine months before the first payment. Participants discovered the problem at the airport, when the flights did not exist. The Court of Appeal upheld his conviction on 23 charges of cheating, but reduced his sentence from 10 years to five.
Takeaway: A company that has been wound up has no legal capacity to carry on business. Concealing that fact while continuing to collect payments can amount to cheating under Section 420 of the Penal Code. For consumers, the case underlines the importance of verifying an operator’s status and being wary of payments into personal accounts rather than a business account.
The Bank, the Wrong Account, and the RM1.16 Million Transfer
An online banking system required both a recipient’s name and account number, but it never checked whether the two matched. When the money went to the wrong account, the High Court held that the bank could not rely on automation to escape its duty of care.
Takeaway: Banks must ensure that required payment details perform a meaningful function. If a system asks for two identifiers, it should at least flag obvious mismatches before a transfer becomes irrevocable. For businesses, the case highlights the importance of checking large transfers carefully and acting quickly if money goes missing.
Read the full article →
View the Large Online Transfer Checklist →
📅 August 2026
This month’s articles: a land-fraud judgment where a businessman and his company were ordered to pay RM1.57 million, a defamation judgment over a viral Threads post, a state’s failed attempt to ban lotteries through licensing, a Muslim convert’s inheritance rights affirmed, a medical negligence case where expert evidence was not required, and the Federal Court’s latest moves in the Sarawak‑Petronas petroleum dispute.
The Land Promises, the Businessman, and the RM1.57 Million Question
Seventeen people paid for land that was never the seller’s to sell. The Sessions Court ordered Datuk Red, his company, and a landowner to pay RM1.57 million, finding that material facts had been concealed and that the director’s active participation exposed him to personal liability.
Takeaway: A director is not personally liable merely because of his position. But where he controls the operations, signs the agreements, knows the title and payments are unsettled, and continues selling, the corporate structure may not shield him. For property buyers, the lesson is clear: conduct a land search before paying, and keep every record.
Christy Ng and the RM180,000 Defamation Judgment
A pseudonymous Threads account posted defamatory allegations about fashion entrepreneur Christy Ng. In assessing damages, the High Court looked beyond the post itself to what the defendant did after publication — and awarded RM180,000.
Takeaway: In online defamation, the story does not end at the post. Courts may consider post‑publication conduct — pseudonymity, further commentary, crowdfunding, and refusal to apologise — when assessing general, aggravated, and exemplary damages. Corporate plaintiffs should note that aggravated damages are generally unavailable because a company cannot suffer injured feelings.
Kedah, the Pool Betting Licences, and the Constitutional Boundary It Could Not Cross
Kedah’s decision to stop renewing premises licences for pool betting outlets triggered a constitutional contest over the limits of state power. The Federal Court refused leave to appeal, leaving intact the Court of Appeal’s 2–1 ruling that a state cannot use local licensing authority to prohibit an activity Parliament has placed under federal control.
Takeaway: For state governments and local councils, the decision confirms that premises licensing powers cannot be used to nullify federal law. For federally licensed businesses, it offers protection against indirect state restrictions. For lawyers, the case clarifies how the courts apply Article 81 of the Federal Constitution and the principle that a state may not do indirectly what it cannot do directly.
The Daughter, the Conversion, and the Inheritance the Law Would Not Deny Her
A Muslim convert found herself excluded from her late father’s estate distribution. The Court of Appeal affirmed what the High Court had already decided: under the Distribution Act 1958, a child’s right to inherit depends on the religion of the deceased, not the religion of the beneficiary. The statutory exclusion applies to the estate of a Muslim person, not to the heirs.
Takeaway: For estate administrators, the case is a reminder that all lawful beneficiaries must be listed regardless of religion when distributing a non‑Muslim’s intestate estate. For lawyers, it provides appellate authority on the scope of section 2 of the Distribution Act. For converts and their families, it confirms that conversion to Islam does not sever the legal right to inherit from non‑Muslim parents under civil law.
The First‑Time Donor, the Torn Artery, and the High Court’s Finding of Negligence
A first‑time blood donor suffered a torn artery during a routine venepuncture. The Alor Star High Court ruled that the injury itself — an arterial tear from a needle that should have entered a vein — was strong prima facie evidence that the standard of care was breached. The judgment also held that a medical negligence plaintiff is not legally required to call an independent expert witness if the treating doctors’ evidence and contemporaneous records sufficiently establish negligence.
Takeaway: For medical practitioners, the case underlines the importance of adhering to clinical guidelines and thoroughly documenting any warning signs during procedures. For lawyers, it clarifies that the absence of an independent expert is not fatal to a medical negligence claim where the physical facts and treating doctors’ records speak clearly. For the public, it is a reminder that even routine procedures carry legal duties — and that patients are entitled to be informed of material risks.
Petronas, Sarawak, and the Petroleum Rights the Law Has Yet to Settle
In January 2026, Petronas sought leave from the Federal Court to challenge the constitutional validity of several Sarawak state laws — including the Distribution of Gas Ordinance 2016 and the Oil Mining Ordinance 1958 — arguing they encroach on federal jurisdiction over upstream petroleum operations and the continental shelf. Sarawak filed its own petition questioning the validity of the Petroleum Development Act 1974 and related federal statutes. The Federal Court granted Petronas leave on 16 March 2026. Since then, Sabar’s application to intervene was dismissed (28 August 2026), both parties confirmed they want separate hearings, and Sarawak asked the court to determine the legitimacy of the 1954 Order in Council as a preliminary issue. The hearing is tentatively set for one week from 25 January 2027.
Takeaway: Until a final judgment is delivered, both federal and state laws claim to apply. Companies operating in the petroleum sector should seek legal advice on compliance with overlapping regulatory systems. The litigation is also a live laboratory for constitutional law: it will test the legislative competence of both the Sarawak Legislature and Parliament, and the continuing force of the Malaysia Agreement 1963 safeguards.
📅 July 2026
This month’s articles: a crypto‑repayment case, a strata‑arrears ruling, a constructive‑dismissal decision, and a sham‑transaction judgment that the Court of Appeal reversed.
A Friendly Loan Repaid in Litecoin — and the Court of Appeal’s Answer
Ong Seow Lee lent RM70,000. The borrower repaid him in Litecoin — 50 units, then worth about RM87,000. Ong accepted the crypto, then sued for cash, arguing Litecoin was not legal tender. The Court of Appeal disagreed: a creditor who knowingly accepts cryptocurrency as repayment cannot later demand the same debt in cash. The decision confirms that digital assets can validly settle contractual obligations when both parties agree — and that you cannot keep the crypto while also claiming the ringgit.
Takeaway: If you accept cryptocurrency as repayment, the debt is discharged. A written acknowledgment at the time of transfer can prevent a dispute years later. For lawyers drafting settlement agreements, specify the type of digital asset, valuation method, timing, and wallet addresses. The case shows that ordinary contract principles are flexible enough to accommodate digital assets — no new legislation was required to reach this result.
An Auction Buyer, a Hidden Debt, and the Bridge the Law Would Not Cross
Harjinder Singh bought a strata office unit at a court‑ordered auction for about RM1.53 million. After registering ownership, he was handed a bill for nearly RM270,000 — maintenance charges and sinking fund arrears accumulated by the previous, now‑liquidated owner. The management corporation argued he was a “successor‑in‑title” under the Strata Management Act 2013. The High Court disagreed, holding that a judicial sale is not a voluntary transfer and that auction buyers cannot be forced to inherit historical strata debts.
Takeaway: A purchaser at a court‑ordered foreclosure auction is not a “successor‑in‑title” under the SMA 2013 and cannot be held liable for pre‑existing maintenance charges and sinking fund arrears. The decision draws a firm line between voluntary transfers — where Brightvite may apply — and judicial sales, where it does not. Management corporations must recover outstanding charges before the defaulting proprietor is wound up; once the unit is sold through a judicial auction, the new owner bears no responsibility for historical debts.
Read the full article →
Read our Client Alert on this case →
A Pay Cut, a Will, and a RM1 Million Constructive Dismissal
Wong Jun Kit spent over 20 years in his father’s forklift business, starting as a technician and rising to manage a branch. After his father died, he challenged the validity of the will. In the same month — October 2018 — his stepmother, a company director, cut his salary from RM27,500 to RM9,000, and later to RM6,000. His wages went unpaid, his EPF and SOCSO contributions stopped, and he was left with no work. The Industrial Court found each of these acts constituted a fundamental breach of his employment contract and an act of retaliation. It awarded him approximately RM1 million. The High Court, Court of Appeal, and Federal Court all agreed — the Federal Court finally refusing leave to appeal in July 2026, with RM50,000 in costs payable to Wong.
Takeaway: A pay cut can be a constructive dismissal — especially when it coincides with an employee asserting a legal right. The “contract test” requires a breach that goes to the root of the contract, and four conditions must be satisfied: a breach by the employer, a breach serious enough to justify resignation, the employee leaving because of that breach (not something else), and no undue delay in resigning. Employers who act against an employee shortly after a dispute arises should expect their motives to be scrutinised. Defences like “poor performance” or “business downturn” must be backed by evidence raised at the time — not invented after the fact. And a family business is not exempt from the Industrial Relations Act: employment rights apply regardless of the shareholding structure.
Read the full article →
Read the case summary →
View the flowchart: The Contract Test Explained →
A Widow Borrowed RM44,000 — and Nearly Lost Her Home
K Anuradha needed money. The businessman who lent her RM44,000 charged 7 percent interest a month and required her to sign a sale‑and‑purchase agreement for her house as security. When she struggled to repay and asked for more help, she was told to sign a statutory declaration and hand over vacant possession — but the additional RM50,000 she sought never arrived. The High Court declared the agreement a sham to conceal an illegal moneylending transaction, ordered the house returned, and awarded damages. On 1 July 2026, the Court of Appeal unanimously affirmed that decision.
Takeaway: Never sign away property rights to secure a personal loan. A document labelled a sale‑and‑purchase agreement will be examined for its true nature, and a transaction masking an illegal moneylending arrangement is void. Unlicensed lending renders the entire loan illegal, and the court can order the return of property, refund of interest, and damages. Statutory declarations and vacant‑possession demands used as pressure tactics may aggravate the lender’s position.
📅 June 2026
This month’s articles: A contract‑termination case that turned on recycled evidence, a director‑vs‑employee ruling that ended with a RM2 million award, a customary‑rights victory over ancestral graves, a corporate‑veil warning, a meter‑tampering back‑bill, and a retaliatory dismissal that cost a company RM153,200.
Recycled Evidence, Material Breaches, and an RM806,925 Counterclaim
Trinity Advance sued Indah Water for RM9 million after its debt collection contract was terminated — but the High Court found it had submitted recycled letters and photographs from 2020 and 2021 as proof of work for 2022. Of 200 letters tendered, only four were current. The judge held that the material breaches justified immediate termination without a rectification period. Trinity Advance’s claim was dismissed, and Indah Water’s counterclaim succeeded, with the court ordering RM806,925 in contractual penalties plus costs.
Takeaway: When a breach goes to the heart of the contract, the innocent party may terminate immediately — no 14‑day rectification period required. Recycled documents destroy credibility; a damages claim without proof is worthless; and failing to call a key witness invites an adverse inference. Post‑termination conduct, such as returning property and accepting a deposit refund without objection, can be treated as acceptance of the termination.
Read the full article →
View the Contractor Oversight Checklist →
Directors, Employees, or Both – the Federal Court’s RM2 Million Answer
Woon Kim Choy and Chang Heng Keong helped build their company from its 1996 incorporation. They drew salaries, paid EPF, and were listed as employees. Yet when a majority‑led EGM ousted them as directors in 2019, the company insisted they were never employees – just directors, and nothing more. The Industrial Court and High Court agreed. The Court of Appeal did not, expressly rejecting the old Inchcape rule and holding that a genuine contract of service – not a title – determines whether someone is a “workman” under the Industrial Relations Act. The Federal Court unanimously affirmed that decision on 24 June 2026, upholding an award of about RM2 million for unfair dismissal.
Takeaway: A director can also be an employee – if a real contract of service exists. The Court of Appeal rejected the outdated Inchcape rule that directors could never be “workmen.” Salaried executive directors who perform operational duties, report to the board, and have statutory deductions made from their pay can bring unfair dismissal claims. Employers must also note that a jurisdictional defence, if it fails, leaves no room to fall back: the company led no evidence of misconduct, and the appellate court refused to give it “a second bite at the cherry.”
Read the full article →
Read our Client Alert on this case →
Customary Rights Survive Relocation — Even When Tombs Are Unnamed
Seven Orang Asli villagers from Pekan found their ancestral burial ground bulldozed to make way for a prawn farm. The High Court awarded them RM20,000 each, but the Court of Appeal overturned it — the tombstones bore no names, and there were no death certificates to prove lineage. The Federal Court unanimously restored the award, holding that customary rights to burial sites survive relocation and cannot be extinguished by a commercial lease. The company’s own apology letter, the court noted, revealed impatience rather than respect.
Takeaway: Customary proprietary rights — including burial grounds — are constitutionally protected and are not lost when a community moves or when land titles are issued to others. In indigenous claims, standing can be established through oral testimony, photographs, and communal memory, not just formal documents. And a company’s apology letter can become powerful evidence of liability.
Read the full article →
Read the case summary →
View the Indigenous Ancestral Rights Checklist →
Piercing the corporate veil is not a remedy for unfairness
When a shopping‑mall tenant stopped paying rent, the owners sued not just the tenant but also the developer. The High Court pierced the corporate veil and made the developer pay. The Court of Appeal reversed that decision, ruling that reasons such as control and shared directors alone aren’t enough—there must be proof of actual fraud or unconscionable conduct.
Takeaway: If you’re structuring a group of companies, document the commercial rationale for each entity and keep their operations genuinely separate. A common director and a shared office won’t justify piercing the veil—but a lack of business substance might invite the attempt.
Read the full article →
View the Corporate Veil Protection Checklist →
The Meter Was Rigged — and the Defence Was a Bare Denial
TNB inspectors visited a wood‑based factory in Port Klang and found a missing terminal seal, plus an extra circuit that let the company remotely manipulate the meter’s voltage readings. The result: a dramatic under‑recording of electricity use. TNB calculated its loss at RM476,124.65 and sued the registered consumer, Top Status KD Sdn Bhd. The company claimed the drop was due to reduced production during the MCO, but the Sessions Court rejected that explanation — the loss period started before the MCO — and found the defence was a “bare denial” that failed to rebut TNB’s prima facie evidence. Judgment: RM476,124.65 to be paid.
Takeaway: Tampering with an electricity meter is a false economy. Under the Electricity Supply Act, TNB’s certified loss statement is prima facie proof of the debt, and the burden shifts to the consumer to raise a credible doubt — a bare denial won’t work. The registered account holder is responsible for the meter on its premises, and any short‑term saving will almost certainly be dwarfed by back‑billing, legal costs, and a court judgment that can run into the hundreds of thousands.
Read the full article →
Read our Client Alert on this case →
When a Company Shields a Bully Instead of Stopping One
R. Kuhendran was a top‑performing credit specialist at American Express Malaysia. For years, he endured harassment by his immediate superior. His complaints went nowhere. When he escalated his concerns to New York, the company responded with a show‑cause letter and dismissal. The Industrial Court saw through it. Chairman Augustine Anthony called it “a malicious act of retaliation” and awarded Kuhendran RM153,200. The court was particularly blunt about the company’s choice to protect the bully rather than its own workforce.
Takeaway: A complaint is not a performance problem. Protecting a bully is more expensive than stopping one. And workplace messages on company platforms—whether Slack, Teams, or WhatsApp—become evidence the company cannot wish away.
Read the full article →
Read the case summary →
View the Hostile Work Environment & Retaliation Prevention Checklist →
📅 May 2026
This month’s articles: an insurer’s broken promise, a habeas‑corpus victory, Malaysia’s first “Persons Unknown” injunction, and a retrenchment the Court of Appeal reversed — now headed to the Federal Court.
The Insurer Offered RM1.225 Million—Then Changed Its Mind
Lai Leong Peng insured her Porsche 911 GT3 RS for its full value. When it was declared beyond economic repair, Pacific & Orient Insurance offered to pay RM1.225 million, then backtracked — demanding she first settle customs duty on the Langkawi‑registered car, and later alleging she had used a false address. The High Court rejected both defences: the customs‑duty demand was “misguided and in bad faith,” the address was genuine, and the insurer had never repudiated the policy. It had already accepted liability. Judgment: RM1.245 million, plus towing and storage costs.
Takeaway: An insurer cannot rewrite the policy after a loss by inventing new conditions. Once a valid claim arises, the contract must be honoured. If misrepresentation is suspected, repudiation must be exercised promptly and in good faith — not after a settlement offer has been made. The courts will enforce insurance promises strictly, and policyholders who document their registration and correspondence hold a decisive advantage.
Read the full article →
View the Insurance Claim Denial Checklist →
Forty Days Beyond His Sentence—and a RM715,000 Award
Simon Momoh was arrested for drink driving, pleaded guilty, served one day in jail, and paid a RM12,000 fine. Instead of release, he was shuttled to Kajang Prison and then an immigration depot — held for a total of 40 days without a magistrate’s remand order. His spouse visa was cancelled and a deportation order issued. The Shah Alam High Court freed him via habeas corpus, finding the detention unconstitutional because no magistrate’s order was sought within 14 days. In a separate civil suit, the court awarded RM600,000 in general damages (RM15,000 per day), RM75,000 in exemplary damages, and RM40,000 in costs.
Takeaway: Detention beyond a served sentence is a clear violation of Article 5 of the Federal Constitution. Habeas corpus is a swift remedy when due process is ignored — the court will order immediate release. Immigration powers cannot be used to cancel a valid pass for an offence outside the Immigration Act. The state can be held liable in substantial damages for unlawful executive action; the RM15,000‑per‑day figure signals that courts will penalise arbitrary detention firmly.
Suing “Persons Unknown”: Malaysia’s First Injunctions Against Anonymous Cyber Fraudsters
A German chemical manufacturer was tricked into paying €123,000 into a Malaysian bank account. The real perpetrators—hidden behind fake emails and manipulated courier documents—remained unknown. The High Court broke new ground: it granted proprietary and Mareva freezing injunctions against “Persons Unknown,” allowed substituted service by email and Dropbox, and issued Malaysia’s first Spartacus Order requiring the anonymous fraudster to identify himself within seven days or face contempt.
Takeaway: Malaysian courts will now grant freezing orders and injunctions against unknown fraudsters who can be identified by their actions—like the email addresses they used or the bank accounts they controlled. Victims can follow the money across accounts, compel banks to disclose information, and even demand the fraudster unmask himself. Businesses should secure all communication channels, including courier post, and have a cyber fraud response plan in place.
Read the full article →
Read the case summary →
View the Cyber Fraud Response Checklist →
A Bank “Shuts Its Eyes to an Obvious Fact of Dishonesty”
Chan Yan Li had been a Maybank customer for over twenty years. In mid‑2021, RM166,000 was transferred out of her loan account into her savings account and then swiftly moved to unknown individuals in multiple transactions, some as early as 5 a.m. She sued the bank for negligence, claiming she never received any SMS alerts. The Sessions Court compared the bank’s records with telco data and found contradictions — the alerts weren’t received. It ruled that the bank “shuts its eyes to an obvious fact of dishonesty” by failing to act on the suspicious spike in activity, and awarded RM166,000 in losses plus RM15,000 in costs.
Takeaway: A bank’s duty to monitor accounts is active, not passive. Unusual transaction patterns — especially sudden spikes at odd hours — must trigger investigation. The standard of care is tied to the technology the bank already possesses: failing to use available systems to detect and prevent unauthorised transfers can amount to negligence. And internal alert records must be independently verifiable; contradictions with telco data can be fatal to the bank’s defence. Even when third‑party fraudsters are convicted, the bank may still bear partial liability for turning a blind eye.
Read the full article →
View the Unauthorised Transaction Checklist →
A Pilot Offered Two Years of Unpaid Leave. The Airline Retrenched Him Instead.
In June 2020, with aviation grounded by the MCO, AirAsia retrenched co‑pilot How Zheng Hong after nearly 11 years of service. He offered to take two years of unpaid leave to help the airline survive; the airline refused. The Industrial Court and High Court both upheld the retrenchment — but the Court of Appeal unanimously reversed those decisions in April 2026. The airline had relied on its parent company’s consolidated accounts rather than the subsidiary’s own financials, departed from the LIFO principle without proper justification, and used the pilot’s medical leave record as a negative factor. The court called the process a “wholesale failure” to follow the Code of Industrial Harmony and awarded How RM147,400 in back wages and compensation. On 29 September 2026, the Federal Court granted AirAsia leave to appeal.
Takeaway: When a company justifies a retrenchment on financial grounds, it must produce its own financial statements — the parent company’s consolidated accounts are not a substitute for proof of the subsidiary’s financial distress. Any departure from the LIFO principle must be justified with objective, verifiable criteria; using medical leave (a statutory right) as a negative factor is particularly dangerous. The Code of Industrial Harmony’s progressive measures — consultation, limiting recruitment, reducing overtime, retraining — must be documented and genuinely attempted, not ignored. These principles currently bind Malaysian employers, subject to the Federal Court’s decision on appeal.
Read the full article →
View the Retrenchment Checklist for Employers →
📅 April 2026
This month’s articles: a singer freed by the prima‑facie rule, a constitutional‑process lesson, and two historic defences that remain good law under the Penal Code.
How a Simple Legal Rule Set a Singer Free
Emily Leong Jo Yee was charged with trafficking 400 grammes of cocaine—an offence carrying the death penalty. The prosecution had to prove she had exclusive control over the drugs found in a house she did not own. They could not. The High Court found no evidence linking her to the drugs, and because the prosecution failed to make out a prima facie case on a key element, the judge had no choice but to acquit her before the defence was ever called. She walked free after more than two years on remand.
Takeaway: The prima facie threshold is a fundamental safeguard. If the prosecution cannot produce credible evidence on every element of the crime, the accused must be acquitted without being required to answer. In capital cases, that initial test can be the difference between a possible death sentence and walking free—and it exists to protect the innocent from baseless prosecutions.
Why a House Arrest Bid Failed
Najib sought judicial review to compel the government to move him from prison to house arrest, relying on an Addendum Order he believed supplemented his royal pardon. The High Court dismissed the application. The Order had never been discussed or voted on at the Pardons Board meeting, as required by Article 42 of the Federal Constitution. The King’s prerogative of mercy must follow the constitutional process; without it, the Order was invalid and not immune from court scrutiny.
Takeaway: The power of pardon is not a personal discretion that can bypass constitutional procedure. If the Pardons Board does not deliberate and advise as prescribed, any resulting order is legally fragile and can be struck down. Public power—however high—must be exercised within the boundaries the Constitution sets, and those boundaries are enforceable by the courts.
When Killing for Heaven Was Not a Crime
Geron Ali beheaded two people—including his own three‑year‑old daughter—believing he was carrying out a sacred command that would secure his place in heaven. The Sessions Court convicted him, but the Calcutta High Court acquitted him under the defence of unsound mind. The court held that while Geron understood he was killing, his insanity meant he did not know his acts were wrong or contrary to law. The same disjunctive test remains in force in Malaysia today under Section 84 of the Penal Code.
Takeaway: The defence of unsound mind does not require total ignorance of the physical act. It can succeed where mental illness prevents the accused from knowing the act was morally wrong or illegal. The burden lies on the accused to prove that state of mind; if established, the result is acquittal—though the court may order the accused to be kept in safe custody.
Read the full article →
View our visual guide: Defence of Unsound Mind →
When Killing a “Ghost” Excused a Homicide
On a dark night in a remote village, Bonda Kui saw a naked, dancing figure and believed it was an evil spirit that fed on human flesh. She struck it dead with a hatchet—only to discover she had killed her sister‑in‑law. The Patna High Court acquitted her under the defence of mistake of fact: she had acted in good faith, genuinely believing the figure was not human, and therefore did not think her act was illegal. The same principle is preserved in Section 79 of Malaysia’s Penal Code.
Takeaway: A person who makes an honest mistake about the facts — not about the law — can be excused from criminal liability if they genuinely believed their action was allowed. The test is whether the belief was real, not whether it was reasonable. This defence of mistake of fact remains part of Malaysian criminal law today.
Read the full article →
View our visual guide: Mistake of Fact →